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"At a time when we are trying to enforce international law and to bring these criminals to
account, we are going to end up with the eyes and ears of the world blind on the ground."
Ed Vulliamy, Reporter for the Observer of London
December 11, 2002

I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2002, a former reporter for the Washington Post was subpoenaed to appear
before Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). 1 In December of that year, the Appeals Chamber tackled his claim for journalistic
privilege. 2 The claim of privilege was one for which there were no guiding provisions in
either the Statute of the Tribunal 3 or its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 4 The Appeals
Chamber, unshackled by restrictive rules, was thus required to make the appropriate
determination in the case, though an affirmative ruling would likely invite future claims of
privilege before the Tribunal.
This article explores the Tribunal's ability to create and amend its own Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. It also focuses on the manner in which the Tribunal addresses
issues that arise, throughout the course of its proceedings, for which its statute and rules are
silent. This article advances the theory that, when confronted with issues that are
controversial, complex, or for which there is a lack of consensus among national legal
systems or the judiciary, the Court should decide the case before it rather than create broad
and binding rules. This proposition is supported by reference to the case law of the
Tribunal, including its handling of the claim ofjournalistic privilege, with a particular focus
given to the fair trial rights of the accused.
II.
A.

THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE ICTY

Rulemaking at PlenaryMeetings
1.

Background

"Continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law
occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia" resulted in a decision by the
Security Council that an international tribunal ought to be established in order to prosecute
1. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, para. 2 (ICTY Trial Chambers 1I June 7, 2002) [hereinafter Brdjanin Subpoena Decision],
available at http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/decision-e/t020612.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
2. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9 (ICTY App.
Chamber
Dec.
11,
2002)
[hereinafter
Brdjanin
Interlocutory
Appeal],
available
at
http://www.un.org/ictyfbrdjanin/appeal/decision-e/randall02121 I.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
3. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, annexed to
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
4. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 1994], amended by U.N. Doe.
IT/32/REV.28 (2003) [hereinafter ICTY RPE 2003], available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2004).
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the perpetrators of the violations.5 Given the prosecutions that took place in the aftermath
of World War II, such a tribunal would not be wholly unique,6 with the prosecutions that
took place at Nuremberg providing the most well-known precedent. 7 The post-World War
1I prosecutions were not without their faults, however, and accordingly, the Security
Council was sensitive to the importance of the fact that the new tribunal not be perceived as
an example of "victors' justice." 8
In response to the Security Council's decision in Resolution 808, 9 the SecretaryGeneral drafted and submitted a report on the potential tribunal.' 0 Citing the Security
Council's Chapter VII powers, which provide the Council with the authority to take
preventive and enforcement measures in order to maintain international peace and security,
the report established a legal basis for the creation of the Tribunal." With regard to
potential claims that the Tribunal's prosecutions would run afoul of the principle that "there
is no crime without law," the report provides that the International Tribunal should apply
only those laws, "which are beyond any doubt part of the customary law."' 12 The Security
Council subsequently adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal, which was annexed
to the Secretary-General's report.' 3 The controlling provision in the Statute regarding trial
proceedings before the Tribunal is Article 20, which states:
The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and
evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses."4
The rules of procedure and evidence that are to apply to trial proceedings before the
Tribunal were not drafted by the Secretary-General, however. Rather, Article 15 of the

5. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
6. Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed, 5
CRIM. L.F. 237, 238 (1994).
7. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 675 (1995)
[hereinafter 2 MORRIS & SCHARF].

8. Natasha A. Affolder, Tadi6, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of InternationalProceduralLaw, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 449 (1998). Although the Tribunal's success in its attempt to avoid being perceived as the
representative of victors' justice is a matter for debate, it is doubtful whether any amount of international
involvement could counter the claim that its existence derives, in part, from the fact that "sovereign equality of
states simply does not exist." Ivan Simonovid, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of InternationalCriminal
Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440,454-55 (1999).
9. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 5, para. 2.
10. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1163 (1993) [hereinafter Rep. of the Sec 'yGen.].
11. Id paras. 18-30. The utilization of Chapter VII powers for this purpose was an issue of concern for
certain Member States. See Simonovi6, supra note 8, at 445.
12. Rep. of the Sec'y-Gen., supra note 10, para. 34. In spite of this decision to prosecute only those crimes
that were decidedly part of the pre-existing law, thus codifying customary norms, it has been asserted that the
ICTY Statute may actually be creating new law. Tomuschat, supra note 6, at 242.
13. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
14. ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(1).
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Statute1 5 provides that the Tribunal's judiciary be given the task of crafting the 6rules; this
delegation was subsequently referred to by one critic as "dynamic yet troubling."'
2.

Article 15

Article 15 of the Statute confers upon the Tribunal's judiciary an authority unknown
to its domestic counterparts. The Article confers both authority and obligations upon the
judges of the Tribunal regarding the drafting of the rules of procedure and evidence that
shall apply at all stages of the proceedings at the Tribunal. The Article thus runs awry of
the issue of separation of powers, both mandating and enabling the judiciary to draft the
rules they will ultimately apply. To aver
that this delegation has been deemed dubious by
7
some is likely to understate the matter.'
Given the exceptional nature of the delegation, the judiciary was confronted with a
challenge regarding the creation of relevant rules, particularly in light of the fact that there
was no precedent from which it could draw. 18 The judiciary was not wholly alone in its
task, however, as it was provided with submissions regarding its potential rules that were
made on behalf of interested states and organizations. 9 Some such proposals were very
short indeed, though the submission received from the United States was unquestionably
comprehensive and, ultimately, "particularly influential.,, 20 The Rules of Procedure and
Evidence that were finally adopted in February 1994 were the product of "extensive debate

15. The relevant article reads, "[t]he judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the
protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters." Id.art. 15.
16. Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal
Tribunalforthe Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 111, 166 (1998).
17. See, e.g., Gideon Boas, CreatingLaws of Evidencefor InternationalCriminal Law: The ICTY and the
Principle of Flexibility, 12 CRiM. L.F. 41, 73 (2001) [hereinafter Boas, The Principle of Flexibility] (noting that the
union of legislative and judicial functions opened the Tribunal to criticism); Pavel Dolenc, A Slovenian Perspective
on the Statute and Rules of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 451, 459 (1994)
("A question of principle may be raised... as to whether it is appropriate to delegate rulemaking authority to the
same body, namely, the judicial organ of the Tribunal, that must apply these rules."); Andrd Klip, The Decreaseof
Protection Under Human Rights Treaties in International Criminal Law, 68 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 291, 302-03
(1997) (asserting that the judiciary's ability to draft and amend the rules it interprets is "disturbing," calls into
question its ability to be impartial, and enables it to act arbitrarily). Disapproval has also been expressed about the
fact that the rules and amendments made to them are not subject to review. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI &
PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 824

(1996) ("Since the Rules have important implications for the fairness of the proceedings.., a procedure for the
review of proposed and amended Rules should be established."); id.at 827 ("A brief period for review and
comment might enhance the substantive quality of the Rules.").
18. The Nuremberg Rules of Procedure contained a mere eleven rules. Rules of Procedure of the
International Military Tribunal (1945), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supranote 7, at 687-91. As a result, the
precedential value of the same has been noted to be "minimal." Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 508 (1994). The Rules
are "believed to be the first detailed set.., ever to be drafted for an international criminal tribunal." Report of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 152, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007 (1994) [hereinafter ICTY First Annual
Report], availableat http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1994/AR94e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
19. These were received pursuant to Security Council Resolution 827. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 13, para. 3.
20. The submission included commentary for guidance. See Suggestions Made by the Government of the
United States of America, Rules of Procedure and Evidencefor the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecutionof
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. No. IT/14 (1993) [hereinafter U.S. Suggestions], reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 7, at 509.
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and revision"'2 1 and included only those items for which there was a general consensus,
"thus reflecting concepts
that are generally recognized as being fair and just in the
22
international arena.,
3.

Rule 6

At the time of their adoption, however, the judicary recognized that there would be a
need to revise and add to the original set of rules. Accordingly, the possibility for future
amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence was addressed in Rule 6.23 The
original version of the Rule provided that a judge, the prosecutor, or the registrar had the
authority to submit proposed amendments to the Rules, and that the agreement of at least
seven judges at the plenary meeting would be required in order for the amendment to
be adopted.24
The annual reports of the Tribunal provide an excellent resource in assessing the
Tribunal's use of its continuing "legislative power. '25 First, a five-judge panel, the Intersessional Working Group for the Amendment of Rules, was established. The Working
Group deliberated the comments submitted by governments, non-governmental
organizations, and individuals, and it presented its report on the same to the fifth plenary
27
session in January 1995.26 As a result of the report, forty-one amendments were adopted;
the multiple changes implemented arguably set the stage for scores of amendments that

21. ICTY FirstAnnual Report, supra note 18, para. 55.
22. Id. para. 53. Though, early on, substantial interest was shown in the Tribunal's enumerated crimes and in
its jurisdiction, its rules of procedure and evidence did not attract comparable attention. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr.,
United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 475, 476-77 (1995).
Similarly, it has been noted that "[p]rocedural rulings at the international level generally receive less attention than
substantive ones." Affolder, supranote 8, at 448.
23. ICTY RPE 1994, supranote 4, R. 6.
24. Id. R. 6(A). All judges must be given notice of the proposals. Id. There were eleven judges at the time
of original adoption. ICTY First Annual Report, supra note 18, para. I. There are presently sixteen permanent
judges. Report of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarian Lav in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 45, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (2002) [hereinafter ICTYNinth Annual Report],
available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2002/AR02-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). Accordingly, the
assent of ten judges is now required for a proposed amendment to be adopted. ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 4, R.
6(A).
25. Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 45 (1999); see Report of the InternationalTribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 50, para. 3,
U.N. Doc. A/51/292-S/1996/665 (1996) [hereinafter ICTY Third Annual Report] (noting that the "U]udges of the
Tribunal
are
obliged
by the
statute to
'legislate'
on
procedural
matters"),
available at
http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1 996/AR96e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
26. Report of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 49, para.
20, U.N. Doc. A/50/365-S/1995/728
(1995),
available at
http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1995/AR95e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
27. Id. The Tribunal cited five goals for amendments, such as to take into account practical problems that
have arisen in implementation of the ICTY Statute or the Rules, broaden the rights of suspects and accused
persons, and protect the rights of victims and witnesses. Id. paras. 21-26.
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were to follow. 28 The judiciary went on to refine its practices with regard to amendments;
the Judicial Department proved to be a helpful tool, acting as a "channel of communication
between the Tribunal and the States. 29 Most recently, the Tribunal formed the Rules
Committee, whose cited purpose was to expedite the trial process while preserving the fair
trial rights of those accused.30
Significant enhancements to the amendment process arrived later in the workings of
the Tribunal when changes were enacted to provide for broader input in terms of
amendment proposals and their assessments. In December 1998, Practice Direction IT/143
was issued with the stated purpose of establishing the "efficient processing of proposals and
consideration of amendments to the Rules. 31 Of particular significance, the Direction
allowed for amendment proposals to be received from outside the narrow context prescribed
in Rule 6(A). 32 This modification made by the directive was seized upon immediately,33
resulting in the entertainment of external proposals for amendments the following year.
Finally, the 2002 annual report of the Tribunal notes the internal reform of the Rules
Committee in order to "ensure better representation of the organs of the Tribunal and the
defence. 34 This broader representation on the Rules Committee was noted by the Tribunal
to buttress the Committee's advisory role; 35 the same was subject to prior criticism for its
failure to include the defense bar within the consultative process.36
The Tribunal has not been shy about utilizing its ability to revise its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence; 37 rather, this is an authority that has been actively used. 38 In the
28. Although a smaller number of amendments were noted the following year, this is an anomaly among the
Tribunal's Annual Reports and is arguably tempered by the fact that some amendments made resulted in "a few
significant changes." ICTY Third Annual Report, supra note 25, para. 66.
29. Id.para. 103.
30. Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess.,
Agenda Item 48, para. 106, U.N. Doc. A/53/219-S/1998/737 (1998), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/rappannue/l998/AR98e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
31. Report of the InternationalTribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 53, para. 108, U.N. Doc. A/54/187-S/1999/846 (1999) [hereinafter 1CTY Sixth Annual
Report], available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1999/AR99e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
32. Id.para. 111; see supra note 24 and accompanying text. This change required the amendment of Rule 6:
a new subsection (C) was created to allow for amendment proposals to be received in accordance with the Practice
Direction. See ICTY RPE 2003, supranote 4, R. 6(C).
33. One proposal was submitted by a state, the other by a non-governmental organization. See Report of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 52, paa. 287, U.N. Doc. A/55/273-S/2000/777 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannue/2000/AR00e.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
34. ICTY Ninth Annual Report, supra note 24, at 4.
35. See id.para. 38.
36. See, e.g., Arbour, supra note 25, at 45 (discussing the consultative nature of the rule-making process);
Johnson, supra note 16, at 172-73 (noting the "organizational problem of the ICTY not having an office of
defence counsel . .. result[s] [in] the prosecutor ha[ving] an unopposed voice in the rule-making process").
37. In fact, "the ICTY has pursued a level of flexibility in the process of creating, amending and interpreting
its Rules with a frequency unknown to any other jurisdiction before it." Boas, The Principleof Flexibility, supra
note 17, at 42. The Tribunal's use of its amendment ability has been referred to as "prolific." Gideon Boas,
Developments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia and the InternationalCriminalCourt, 12 CRIM. L.F. 167, 169 (2001).
38. According to one source, "[o]ne definitely needs a loose-leaf version of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence." Dirk Ryneveld & Daryl A. Mundis, The Contribution of the ICTY to the ICC: Procedural and
Evidentiary Aspects from a Practitioner'sPerspective, in THE CHANGING FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: SELECTED PAPERs 51, 61 (2002), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/
ChangingFace.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
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realm of amendments to the Rules, the Tribunal has taken affirmative steps to expand what
has been christened a "quasi-legislative" 39 process, while at the same time incorporating
mechanisms for its streamlining. The value of the amendment process has been noted by
the Tribunal as a mechanism that enables the judiciary to react to new and emerging issues
experienced by it, in a manner that is consistent with the provision that its proceedings be
fair and expeditious and provide due regard for victims and witnesses. 40 While the
amendment process may thus serve well as a reactive tool, allowing the Tribunal to make
necessary changes in response to issues that may not have been anticipated, what of
problems experienced in the course of proceedings for which there are no provisions in the
Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence?
B.

Proceduraland Evidentiary Gaps Experienced in Proceedings
1.

Sub-rule 6(B)

Sub-rule 6(B) provides that an amendment to the Rules may be immediately adopted
provided that there is unanimous consent among the permanent judges. 4 1 Arguably, this is a
tool that could be used when an unforeseen issue arises during the course of a proceeding.
However, the likelihood of its application in such a context is virtually non-existent. As an
initial matter, although the Rules, as originally adopted, provided that amendments would
enter into force immediately, 42 the present Rules direct that an amendment enters into force
seven days after its official date of issue. 43 Further, from a practical perspective, the
possibility of the use of unanimous consent to effectuate an amendment during the course of
proceedings is an unlikely one, under either version of the provision. The provision is one
that has been used sparingly, and only then in the context of emergency situations.44
2.

Inherent Powers

Another possibility is that the Tribunal may resort to the use of its "inherent
powers. ' '45 In determining the applicability of these powers, it is instructive to review both
the relevant definition of the same, as well as those situations in which the Trial and
Appeals Chambers have utilized the powers. The International Court of Justice, the judicial
arm of the United Nations, has stated that it possesses inherent powers in order to enable "it
39. ICTY First Annual Report, supra note 18, para. 27 (noting the nature of the newly formed Tribunal's
"task of preparing a code of criminal procedure (its rules of procedure and evidence)"); BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS,
supra note 17, at 270.
40. See ICTY Sixth Annual Report, supra note 31, para. 107 (noting that "[a]s the Tribunal conducts more
trials and begins hearing substantive appeals it will be necessary to review and, where appropriate, amend the
Rules in order to ensure the proper administration ofjustice under the Tribunal's mandate").
41. ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 4, R. 6(B).
42. ICTY RPE 1994, supra note 4, R. 6(C).
43. ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 4, R. 6(D). Under either version of this provision, the efficacy of all types
of amendments is qualified: amendments "shall not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused or of a convicted
or acquitted person in any pending case." Id.
44. See, e.g., Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and Procedurefor InternationalCriminal Law? The Rules
of the ICTY, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY 1, 6 (Gideon
Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2003) (noting that Sub-rule 6 has been invoked only three times to date).
45. See, e.g., Michele Buteau & Gabriel Oosthuizen, When the Statute and Rules are Silent: The Inherent
Powers of the Tribunal, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK
MCDONALD 65, 65 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (discussing how the Tribunal uses its "inherent powers" when
there is not a provision specifically addressing the problem).
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to take such action as may be required, on the one hand to ensure that the exercise of its
jurisdiction over the merits.., shall not be frustrated, and on the other, to provide for the
orderly settlement of all matters in dispute. ' 46 The ICTY Appeals Chamber has
acknowledged that "'incidental' or 'inherent' jurisdiction... derives automatically from the
exercise of the judicial function ' 7 and that it "inures to the benefit of the International
Tribunal in order that its basic judicial function may be fully discharged and its judicial role
safeguarded." 8 The Appeals Chamber further illuminated the concept by providing that
these are "powers ... which accrue to a judicial body even if not explicitly or implicitly
provided for in the statute or rules of procedure of such a body, because they are essential
for the carrying out of judicial functions and ensuring the fair administration of justice. ' 49
In application, the powers have been cited by the Tribunal as authorization to
"determine its own jurisdiction" 50 and, under certain circumstances, to enable it to issue a
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum directly to an individual, rather than proceed through a
national authority. 51 The Tribunal has also called upon its inherent powers to legitimize its
creation and enforce its rules of contempt,5 2 to sanction the relief of a counsel of his
duties, 5 3 and to empower it to refuse audience to counsel.5 4 In the Tadi6 judgment, the
Appeals Chamber found that the ability to order the disclosure of defense witness
statements, after the witnesses had testified, is a function authorized by its
inherent powers.5 5
Thus, these examples reveal the use of inherent powers in primarily "technical"
situations: the powers have been called upon where the Tribunal needed to act, but could
not derive explicit authority for its actions in either its Statute or its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. To assume, however, that the exercise of the powers is so limited would be to
adopt an overly restrictive construction of the concept of inherent powers. When the issue
of testimonial privilege vis-A-vis the International Committee of the Red Cross was
addressed by the ICTY, Judge David Hunt ascribed sweeping relevance to the powers.5 6

46. Nuclear Tests Case (Austi. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 259 (Judgment of Dec. 20), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iaf/iaf-ijudgment/iaf ijudgment_19741220.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2003).
47. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No.
IT-94-1-AR72, para. 14 (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadi6 Jurisdiction Appeal], available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
48. Prosecutor v. Blagkik, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of
Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case No. IT-95-14-ARlO8bis, para. 33 (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 29, 1997)
(hereinafter Bla~kid Croatian Appeal], available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/decisione/71029JT3.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
49. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 322 (ICTY App. Chamber July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadid Appeal Judgment] (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/
judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
50. Tadi6 Jurisdiction Appeal, supra note 47, par. 18.
51. Blagkik Croatian Appeal, supra note 48, paras. 55-56.
52. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Case No.
IT-94-1-A-R77, paras. 13, 18 (ICTY App. Chamber Jan. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Tadi Contempt Judgment],
available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/vujin-e/vuj-aj0013 le.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
53. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Order on the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel Due to Conflict of Interest, Case No.
IT-96-21-A (ICTY App. Chamber June 24, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/ordere/90624DS39408.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
54. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Decision on the Request of the Accused Radomir Kova6 to Allow Mr. Milan
Vujin to Appear as Co-Counsel Acting Pro-Bono, Case No. IT-96-23-PT, para. 13 (ICTY Trial Chamber Mar. 14,
(last visited Feb.
2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/decision-e/00314DS212571.htm
28, 2004).
55. Tadid Appeal Judgment, supra note 49, para. 322.
56. See Prosecutor v. Simi6 and Others, Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on the Prosecutor's Motion
for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, para. 25 (ICTY Trial Chamber III July
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According to his separate opinion on the matter, the Tribunal's inherent power exists to
"ensure that justice is done" and "it is against this background that [a matter] must
57
be determined.,
3.

Sub-rule 89(B)

In the alternative, if a gap left by the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
is of an evidentiary nature, another mechanism for filling the void can be found in Sub-rule
89(B), one of the general provisions of the Rules of Evidence, which provides:
[iun cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules
of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it
and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles
of law.58
Sub-rule 89(B)'s requirement that the rules of evidence, applied pursuant to it, be consonant
with the "spirit of the Statute" has been deemed to refer to the Statute's mandate that
proceedings be "fair and expeditious., 59 The Sub-rule's reference to "general principles of
law" is arguably less straightforward. Referring to Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute for the
International Court of Justice, which cites the "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," Trial Chamber II noted the same to be construed by one source as "rules
accepted in the domestic laws of all civilised States., 60 Judge Ninian Stephen has further
illuminated the concept, indicating that "where a substantial number of well-recognised
legal systems adopt a particular solution to a problem it is appropriate to regard that
solution as 6involving
some quite general principle of law such as is referred to in Sub1
rule 89(B).,

It has been observed that Sub-rule 89(B) seems to authorize judicial supplementation
of the few enumerated rules with imported standards from domestic systems. 62 The practice
and decisions of the Trial Chambers have certainly confirmed this. 63 That there would be

27, 1999) [hereinafter Separate Opinion of Judge Hunt], availableat http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/decisione/90727EV5955 1.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
57. Id.
58. ICTY RPE 2003, supranote 4, R. 89(B).
59.

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 259-60 (1995) [hereinafter 1 MORRIS & SCHARF]. Ntanda Nsereko,
however, notes the requirement to include the entirety of Article 20(1) and thus, in addition to finding that this
means that the proceedings be "fair and expeditious," he also includes that the rights of the accused be fully
respected and that "due regard ... [be given to] the protection of victims and witnesses" within the meaning of the
"spirit of the Statute." Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 18, at 541 (quoting the ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(1)).
60. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Decision on the Motion to Allow Witnesses K, L and M to Give Their Testimony
by Means of Video-Link Conference, Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 8 (ICTY Trial Chamber May 28, 1997)
Video-Link Decision], available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision[hereinafter Delali
e/70528vI2.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
61. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on Prosecution Motion for Production of
Defence Witness Statements, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at 4 (ICTY Trial Chamber Nov. 27, 1996) [hereinafter Separate
Opinion of Judge Stephen], available at http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/61127WS26398.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2004). In the Delali6 case, the Trial Chamber subsequently cited this position as explanatory of
Sub-rule 89(B). Delali6 Video-Link Decision, supranote 60, para. 11.
62. Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 18, at 541. This is noteworthy due to the fact that Sub-rule 89(A) provides
that the Trial Chambers are not bound by national rules of evidence. ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 4, R. 89(A).
63. Paragraph 10 states:
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evidentiary gaps in the rules was a given. 64 Not unlike the precedent set at Nuremberg,65
the evidentiary rules governing the Tribunal present something akin to a "bare bones"
approach. One might say that this is the hallmark of the rules of evidence in the forum of
international criminal prosecution, appropriate in light of the fact that professional judges,
rather than lay jurors, are assessing the value of the evidence before them, 66 and is possibly
the natural result of uniting dissimilar legal68systems. 67 Of the 125 rules initially adopted for
the ICTY, only ten were rules of evidence.
Rule 89 is the primary evidentiary rule; amongst its remaining general provisions are
the principles that relevant evidence with probative value is admissible,69 with the caveat
that such evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the need to ensure a fair trial., 70 The Tribunal's approach to evidence is consistent with
what has been deemed a "fundamental principle" with regard to evidence in international
proceedings: "courts are not bound by strict and 'technical' rules of evidence but enjoy
great flexibility
and should be guided, rather than by formal standards, by general principles
7
of fairness."

1

Thus, it was anticipated that Sub-rule 89(B), the "residual rule, 72 would serve as a
useful tool in the operation of the Tribunal. 73 The Sub-rule plays an integral role in a forum
where "complex factual scenarios" and the potential for extensive numbers of witnesses and
exhibits require elastic evidentiary rules.74 This concept of flexibility does not exist without
criticism, however. It has been noted that with the absence of clearly defined rules comes
the potential for uncertainty.75 The flexibility principle has been cited by one critic as
contributing to the contention that the Tribunal "is a rogue court with rigged rules. 76 It has
also created a situation wherein "the RPE of each Tribunal is not identical on issues vital to

It seems to the Trial Chamber indisputable, therefore, that the unqualified intention of Sub-rule 89(B)
is to enable the Chambers to apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence in so far as they
are applicable to the matter before it and are consonant with the Statute. Accordingly, the Trial
Chamber is free to apply such provisions of the law of evidence of major legal systems not
inconsistent with the Statute.
Delalid Video-Link Decision, supra note 60, para. 10.
64. The Trial Chamber noted that "[t]he Judges of the International Tribunal, in drafting the Rules, were
cognisant of their paucity and the evident fact that they cannot conceivably provide for many of the situations that
could arise in an international tribunal of this nature." Id. para. 9.
65. See ICTY FirstAnnual Report,supra note 18, para. 54; Ntanda Nsereko, supranote 18, at 508.
66. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 422 (2003).
67. ARCHBOLD, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 249 (Rodney
Dixon et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter ARCHBOLD].
68. Ryneveld & Mundis, supra note 38, at 54.
69. ICTY RPE 2003, supranote 4, R. 89(C).
70. Id.R. 89(D).
71. CASSESE, supranote 66, at 421.
72. 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 59, at 259.
73. The Sub-rule affords "a golden opportunity to craft a workable and just procedural and evidentiary
regime that will foster the interests of international justice." Ntanda Nsereko, supranote 18, at 554.
74. ARCHBOLD, supra note 67, at 249.
75. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 17, at 950. "There are obvious uncertainties for defendants and their
attorneys posed by the wide-open license given to the tribunal to apply 'rules of evidence which will best favour a
fair determination of the matter' and 'are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of
law."' Jos6 E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadi6 Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2031, 2066 n.128
(1998) (quoting Rule 89(B) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
76. John Laughland, The Anomalies of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalare Legion... TIMES (London),
June 17, 1999, at 24.

A PLACE FOR MINIMALISM AT THE ICTY

2004]

the fair administration of justice."

7

Another noted difficulty with the "standard" is the

resultant inability of counsel to determine the strength of his or her case while in trial.7 8
These observations provide an interesting contrast to the fact that "Sub-rule 89(B)
establishes the79issue of fairness as the overriding concern in matters not explicitly addressed
in the Rules.,

4.

Which Authority to Employ?

The ability of the Tribunal to address issues that arise during the course of
proceedings, for which there are no controlling provisions in the Statute or the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, thus exists under Sub-rule 6(B), the doctrine of inherent powers,
and Sub-rule 89(B). While it is unlikely that Sub-rule 6(B) would be employed in such
situations, 80 the remaining two options are actively engaged by the Tribunal in precisely
such circumstances. Undoubtedly, the relevance of the chosen option is enhanced when the
alternative choice would result in a different outcome. With regard to the use of either the
doctrine of inherent powers or Sub-rule 89(B), it is often not necessarily apparent which
tool has been employed by the Tribunal in a given situation, nor is it always clear which
authority should be drawn upon by it.
An example of the complexity involved in making such a determination is evidenced
in the Tadi6 case, where the appeal judgment addressed the ability of Trial Chambers to
order the production of defense witness statements after the witnesses had testified.81 While
the prosecutor asserted that the Trial Chamber had the power to disclose the witness
statements pursuant to Sub-rule 89(B), 82 the Appeals Chamber disagreed with this position.
Although acknowledging that "since the Statute and the Rules do not expressly cover the
problem at hand, the broad powers conferred by Sub-rule 89(B) may come into play, 83 the
Appeals Chamber chose instead to focus on the manner in which prior statements are useful
to the Trial Chamber. Noting the benefit of such statements with regard to the Trial
Chamber's ability to evaluate testimony, and thus their function in the Trial Chamber's
quest for truth and its purpose of ensuring a fair trial, the Appeals Chamber found the power

77.

Michatl Wladimiroff, Rights of Suspects and Accused, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL

AND NATIONAL COURTS 419, 450

(Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000). This, of course, runs contrary to "the right of an
accused to have like cases treated alike." Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14/l-A, para. 105
(ICTY App. Chamber Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Aleksovski Judgement Appeal], available at
http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/judgement/ale-asj000324e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004); see also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., arts. 7, 10, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); American Convention
on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 147 (entered into
force July 18, 1978); Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,
art. 7, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 1.L.M. 58, 60 (1982); Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights, Sept. 19, 1981, art. 111, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 435 (1982).
78. Ryneveld & Mundis, supra note 38, at 56.
79. Cristian DeFrancia, Note, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters, 87
VA. L. REV. 1381, 1413 (2001).
80. See discussion supra Part II.B.I.
81. See, e.g., Tadid Appeal Judgment, supranote 49 paras. 306-26.
82. See id. para. 309.
83. Id. para. 320.
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to order the production of statements within the Tribunal's inherent jurisdiction.84
Critically speaking, it appears that this type of analysis could be made under virtually any
set of circumstances; thus, the Appeals Chamber's position on this matter leaves one with
no clear indication as to when a situation should be subject to an examination of this kind
rather than a reference to the authority of Sub-rule 89(B). To further muddy the waters, it is
interesting to note that Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, in her dissenting Trial Chamber
opinion on the matter, appears to unite the doctrine of inherent powers with Sub-rule 889(B)
in order to bring about the Tribunal's ability to order the production of the statements. 5
Thus, with regard to the use of the doctrine of inherent powers versus that of Sub-rule
89(B), it seems likely that there may be both a lack of unanimity and a lack of clarity
among the judiciary with regard to which power should be employed in a given situation.
To refer to the issue as uncertain would likely understate the matter. However, it does seem
clear that under either provision the.Tribunal should be guided by fairness in making its
determination. This is true in the general sense that, as a derivative of the Security Council,
the Tribunal attempts to "practice what the United Nations preaches" and thus provide "fair
criminal proceedings that may be emulated by member states.",86 It is also an intrinsic
aspect of the principle of flexibility enjoyed in an international forum 87 and takes into
account the right to a fair hearing as articulated in Article 21 of the Statute. 88 Further, it is
consistent with the Tribunal's interpretation of inherent powers 89 and the actual wording of
Sub-rule 89(B). 90

III.
A.

THE RULES AND POWERS IN OPERATION

Testimonial Privilege

The capacity of the Tribunal to fill evidentiary lacunae throughout the course of its
proceedings, either through the use of its inherent powers or Sub-rule 89(B), is relevant
with regard to a claim of testimonial privilege. Though the evidentiary rules of the Tribunal
address the issue of privilege in the contexts of self-incrimination 91 and lawyer-client, 92 they
remain silent as to the existence of any other privileges. While the judges considered
including additional privileges during the drafting process of the Rules, the decision was

84. Id. para. 322.
85. Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The
Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 760-61 (1999) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness
Statements, Case No. IT-94-1, paras. 6, 45-46 (ICTY Trial Chamber Nov. 27, 1996)).
86. Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 18, at 510.
87. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
88. ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 21. The right "implies that, in a given situation, even if there are no
express provisions that regulate it, the interpreter should prefer the solution that ensures the concrete realization of
a fair trial."

Salvatore ZappalA, The Rights of the Accused, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1319, 1329 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
89. See, e.g., Separate Opinion of Judge Hunt, supra note 56, para. 25 ("The Tribunal... has an inherent
power, deriving from its proceedings in such a way as to ensure that justice is done."); see also Tadi6 Appeal
Judgment, supra note 49, para. 322 ("Rather than deriving from the sweeping provisions of Sub-rule 89(B), this
power [to ensure a fair trial] is inherent in the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, as it is within the
jurisdiction of any criminal court, national or international.").
90. "In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules of evidence which will
best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the
general principles of law." ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 4, R. 89(B) (emphasis added).
91. Id.R. 90(E).
92. Id.R. 97.
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made to affirmatively identify "only the two most widely-recognized privileges."93 The
possibility remains, however, for subsequent amendments to the Rules to include other
privileges. 94 It has also been noted that witnesses "should be given the opportunity to raise
a privilege[J" thus, the limitation of the Rules to the two noted privileges does not rule out
the prospect that other
classes of individuals may be relieved of their
95
testimonial obligations.
B.

The Simid Case

In fact, a claim of testimonial privilege was made before the Tribunal with regard to
information known to a former employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).96 In the Simi6 case, the Trial Chamber was asked to decide whether the former
employee might come forth to give evidence of facts, ascertained by him, through his
employment with the ICRC.97 Though the individual in question was willing to testify, he
had signed a "pledge of discretion" in his employment contract. 98 According to the ICRC,
this contract requirement was consistent with its internal policy and necessary to carry out
its mandate. 99 The ICRC also maintained that the Tribunal has the inherent authority, upon
a sufficient showing regarding principle and public policy, to order that certain evidence be
excluded.100 The organization proposed that the Tribunal use this authority to exclude the
evidence sought to be introduced without the consent of the ICRC.' 0
Although the Trial Chamber ultimately found that the ICRC has the right to nondisclosure of information related to its activities, it did not accept the offer to so decide by
virtue of its inherent authority. Rather, the Trial Chamber found that the ICRC has a right
under customary international law to non-disclosure of the information.'0 2 The Trial
Chamber came to this conclusion based upon the history of the ICRC, finding that the same
reveals that parties to the Geneva Conventions assumed a conventional obligation to ensure
non-disclosure in judicial proceedings of information relating to the work of the ICRC,
including that which is in the possession of its employees. 0 3 Thus, the Trial Chamber did
not have to address the issue of the Tribunal's authority to grant the privilege, rather it

93. 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 59, at 266-67. In a like manner, the U.S. proposal indicates in its
commentary to Rule 25.11 that "[o]ther privileges recognized in various jurisdictions were considered and
specifically rejected." U.S. Suggestions, supra note 20, at 549.
94. 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 59, at 267.

95. Id. at 266-67.
96. Prosecutor v. Simi6, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the
Testimony of a Witness, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, para. I (ICTY Trial Chamber July 27, 1999) [hereinafter Simi6
Witness Decision], available at http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/decision-e/90727EV59549.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2004).
97.

Buteau & Oosthuizen, supra note 45, at 74.

98. Simi6 Witness Decision, supra note 96, para. 55.
99. Id.para. 56.
100.
101.

Id. para. 19.
The ICRC, however, only maintained that this would be the result absent a showing of an

"overwhelming need" on behalf of the party seeking to proffer the evidence. Id. This differs from its alternative
contention that its protection is absolute. Separate Opinion of Judge Hunt, supra note 56, para. 10.
102. Simid Witness Decision, supranote 96, para. 74.
103. Id.para. 73. According to the Trial Chamber, the ratification of the Geneva Conventions by 188 states
can be considered as reflecting the opinio juris of the State Parties, which, in addition to the general practice of
states, creates the right to non-disclosure under customary international law. Id.para. 74.
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found the Tribunal bound by customary international
law, whose effect, quite simply,
0 4
served to bar the admission of the testimony.'
Though this approach enabled the Trial Chamber to circumvent the need to determine
the relevant authority controlling its ability to recognize claims of testimonial privilege, as
well as avoid a potential analysis of the appropriate balance between the confidentiality
interest at issue and the need to ensure that all relevant and probative evidence be available
to the Trial Chamber, the same cannot be said of Judge Hunt's separate opinion. In his
concurring opinion, Hunt clearly states that he is not convinced that the answer to the
ICRC's claim of testimonial privilege is supplied by customary international law. 10 5 Hunt
then analyzes the issue and, in so doing, appears to take into account both Sub-rule 89(B)
and the doctrine of inherent powers. Noting the Tribunal's obligation to ensure fair and
expeditious trials to those indicted before it,'0 6 Hunt also addresses the issue of general
principles of law. 10 7 The opinion then goes on to speak to the inherent power that the
0 8
Tribunal has to control its proceedings in such a way as to ensure that justice is done.1
Hunt cautions against the issuance of an absolute privilege. In particular, he implies that a
blanket privilege may very well impede the Tribunal's mandate to ensure a fair trial.'0 9
Hunt avers, "I do not accept that it is necessarily for the greater good to sacrifice the liberty
of an innocent person in order to ensure the ICRC's protection against disclosure, yet this is
the inevitable consequence of the ICRC's claim."" 0 Noting that "[i]t is impossible to
foresee every situation which may arise," Hunt contends that the court should be able to
weigh the competing interests in every case."' Hunt then engages in a balancing exercise
with an eye towards the assurance of a fair trial" 12 and, noting that the evidence in question
is not essential to the prosecution's case, finds that the balance lies in favor of keeping the
information confidential. "3
Judge Hunt's separate opinion is worthy of remark for a number of respects. The
opinion creates some concern due to its lack of clarity as to whether it finds its authority in
the inherent powers of the Tribunal, Sub-rule 89(B), or both.' 14 In light of the fact that the
Tribunal has been given wide latitude in adopting and adapting the Rules of Procedure and
104.
105.

Id. para. 76.
Separate Opinion of Judge Hunt, supra note 56, para. 23.

106.

Id. para. 25. Sub-rule 89(B) requires that the rules of evidence, applied pursuant to it, be consonant with

the "spirit of the Statute."

ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 4, R. 89(B). The latter has been deemed to refer to the

ICTY Statute's mandate that proceedings be fair and expeditious. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
107. It is also a requirement of 89(B) that the rules of evidence be applied in accord with the general
principles of law. ICTY RPE 2003, supra note 4, R. 89(B). Judge Hunt states, however, that it is not easy to

discover general principles of law with regard to the issue of confidentiality due to the fact that such provisions
would be codified in civil law systems and subject to a balancing of interests in common law systems. Separate
Opinion of Judge Hunt, supra note 56, para. 24.

108. Separate Opinion of Judge Hunt, supra note 56, para. 25. The requirement that justice be done is akin
to 89(B)'s requirement that the rules applied "best favour a fair determination of the matter before it." ICTY RPE
2003, supra note 4, R. 89(B).
109. The first example given for this is when the evidence sought is vital to establish innocence: "Is the
accused to be found guilty and sentenced to a substantial term of imprisonment in order to ensure the ICRC's
protection against the risk of disclosure?" Separate Opinion of Judge Hunt, supra note 56, para. 29. The second
situation noted is where the evidence withheld is vital to establish the guilt of an accused in a case of
"transcendental importance." Id. para. 31.
110. Id.para.30.
111. ld.para. 32.
112. The test applied is whether the evidence in question is so essential to the case of the relevant party as to
outweigh the risks associated with the breach of confidence in the case. Id.para. 35.
113. Id. paras. 40-41.
114. Hunt's approach in this regard is similar to that of Judge McDonald in the Tadi6 Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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Evidence, a failure on its behalf to identify the authority for its decisions in this regard
serves only to intensify the criticisms of its custom of flexibility. A clear citation of
authority also decreases the likelihood that some of the problems attendant to flexibility will
be exacerbated, such as its consequent degree of uncertainty. Of seminal importance, if the
Tribunal clearly cites the authority for its action, it is also less likely to act, or be criticized
for acting, in a manner that is ultra vires. A clear articulation of the authority that
empowers its decisions, along with a cogent analysis of its application, would do much to
address this potential difficulty.
However, Judge Hunt's opinion is worthy of commendation in that it highlights the
overriding importance of the fact that decisions made by the Tribunal regarding procedural
matters be motivated by the requirement that trials proceed fairly. Obviously, this is a
primary concern in his analysis of the claim by the ICRC. Another noteworthy and
encouraging aspect of Hunt's opinion is its recognition that the Tribunal should be wary of
the dangers inherent in creating a blanket exception to testimonial obligations. By so
stating, Hunt evidences an appreciation of the fact that the importance of the Tribunal's
procedural decisions should not be underestimated; in fact, some have suggested that they
serve to develop "the common law of international [criminal] evidence and procedure."1' 1 5
This makes practical sense both in light of the fact that an element of stare decisis is present
within the workings of the Tribunal' 16 and that its decisions will undoubtedly be viewed as
persuasive in the context of other international tribunals. Hunt's opinion advocates a
method of judicial decision-making that is the antithesis of the majority's broad decision; he
limits his query to the matter before the Trial Chamber1 17 and cautions against the risks
associated with expansive pronouncements.
C.

Decisional Minimalism

This separate opinion, thus, advances a form of decision-making that has been
christened by Cass Sunstein as "decisional minimalism." 118 Arguably, this method of
judicial decision-making is ideally suited to the Tribunal's resolution of problems,
experienced during the course of proceedings, for which there are no provisions in its
Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 119 Minimalism calls for cases to be decided,
rather than for the setting of broad rules; as a result, it reduces the burden of making

115. DeFrancia, supra note 79, at 1399. "[T]he combined roles of stare decisis and analogical reasoning
ensure that cases, once decided, will have a certain impact on the future." Cass Sunstein, Leaving Things
Undecided, I10 HARV. L. REV. 6, 35 (1996).
116. With regard to whether the Appeals Chamber is bound to follow its previous decisions, "the normal rule
is that previous decisions are to be followed, and departure from them is the exception." Aleksovski Judgment
Appeal, supra note 77, para. 109. According to the Appeals Chamber, "a proper construction of the Statute
requires that the ratio decidendi of its decisions is binding on Trial Chambers." Id. para. 113. However, "the
decisions of Trial Chambers ...have no binding force on each other." Id. para. 114.
117. Separate Opinion of Judge Hunt, supra note 56, para. 6.
118. Sunstein, supra note 115, at 6-7. In the short period of time that has passed since Sunstein isolated this
form of judicial decision-making and introduced his assessment of it, Sunstein's theories have received significant
academic attention, along with approval from such figures as Richard Posner and Abner Mikva. For an overview,
including references to Sunstein's "stunningly prolific body of work," see Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New
JudicialMinimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1455 (2000).
119. "Minimalism's virtues depend on the context." Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theoryfor Criminal
Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the ContinuingQuest for Broad-but-shallow,43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4
(2001). According to Sunstein, "[i]t would be foolish to be a thoroughgoing minimalist; the case for breadth is
strong in too many cases." Sunstein, supra note 115, at 16.
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decisions and decreases the dangers associated with erroneous decisions. 120 It is the
opposite approach to maximalism, whose inherent attributes are broad, binding rules and
deep, theoretical justifications for outcomes. 12 1 According to Sunstein, "good judges try to
minimize the sum of decision costs and error costs."'' 22 Decision costs include those costs
associated with reaching a decision, as in the Simi6 case, where the majority was required to
go to great lengths to establish that customary international law provides the ICRC with the
right to non-disclosure. 123 In the same case, Hunt's concerns about the effect that the
decision may have on the fair trial rights of the accused reflect an appreciation for error
costs. 124
25
While some may argue that decisional minimalism, an Anglo-American tradition
often associated with a judicial approach to difficult constitutional questions, is an
inadequate fit with regard to the unique workings of the Tribunal, a review of the rationale
behind and in support of the concept reveals the fallacy of this position. In the domestic
context, it is argued that minimalism usually makes sense when the Court is addressing a
complex issue about which people are divided.1 26 This parallels nicely with procedural
issues for which there is a lack of consensus among national legal systems or among the
judges in the Tribunal. Mindful of the fact that the Rules adopted by the Tribunal in accord
with the rule-making process represent only measures upon which there was broad
agreement, it is logical to anticipate that some of the gaps addressed by the Trial Chambers,
throughout the course of proceedings, relate to issues upon which the opinions of judges
differ. Employing minimalism, judges who cannot agree on the implementation of' 27a
particular rule "might well be able to agree on how a particular case should be handled."'
This method of decision-making has an added benefit in that it leaves the adoption of broad
and binding rules to the confines of the rule-making process, where such proposals will
receive input from all organs of the Tribunal and the defense and will be addressed by the
whole of the Tribunal's judiciary. When minimalism is practiced, a majority of two judges
in the Trial Chambers, or three judges in the Appeals Chambers, will not be able to
"legislate from the bench" on contentious procedural issues.
The importance of this becomes increasingly apparent when a second parallel is
drawn with regard to minimalism on the national level. Minimalism is said to be
"democracy forcing," specifically, in that it leaves issues open for democratic deliberation
and promotes reason giving on the part of the judiciary. 128 While at first blush this invites
the perception that minimalism is a singularly domestic concept, again there is a clear place
for this model within the workings of the Tribunal. The legislative aspects associated with
the rule-making process should not be ignored. The report of the Secretary-General
specifies that "the judges of the International Tribunal as a whole should draft and adopt the
rules of procedure and evidence." 129 After recently altering the manner in which it deals
with amendments, the Tribunal itself noted that "proposed amendments to the Rules will
now be the result of in-depth discussions which take into consideration the opinions and
120. Sunstein, supra note 115, at 16.
121. Id. at 15.
122. Id. at 16. "Decision costs are the costs of reaching judgments." Id. "Error costs are the costs of
mistaken judgments as they affect the social and legal systems as a whole." Id. at 18.
123. See Simi6 Witness Decision, supra note 96, paras. 45-64.
124. See generally supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
125. "Anglo-American courts often take small rather than large steps, bracketing the hardest and most
divisive issues." CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, at ix (1999).
126. Sunstein, supra note 115, at 8.
127. Id.at2l.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Rep. of the Sec 'y-Gen., supranote 10, para. 83 (emphasis added).
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interests of the Office of the Prosecutor and representatives of the defence counsel. 1 30 In a
manner akin to domestic lawmaking, rules that have been subject to the Tribunal's
amendment process have, at times, been the result of "significant compromise."' 3 1 Actions
taken in the absence of this amendment process will not benefit from this exchange and
deliberation; rather, such activity, which circumvents the rule-making process, may enable a
set of judges to create a rule that would not have garnered the requisite support for its
adoption. Such an action would likely not give due regard to the ramifications of the
decision. With minimalism in place, detailed reasoning will be supplied for the decisions
that are rendered and broad reaching rules will have the benefit of having gone through the
consultative, rule-making process. Arguably recognizing the importance of this method of
judicial decision-making, minimalism was again employed by the Trial Chamber in a later
case involving a claim of testimonial privilege.
IV.
A.

THE RANDAL MATTER

FactualandProceduralHistory

In January 2002, in the case of Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, the Office of the
Prosecutor sought to introduce into evidence a newspaper article written by journalist
Jonathan Randal, along with a written statement also made by him. 132 The article, which
had been published in the Washington Post in February 1993, was the result of the
journalist's interview of the accused, Brdjanin.133 The piece in question contains numerous
statements attributed to the accused, Brdjanin, who "was charged in a 12-count indictment
with, among other things, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions," including deportation and forced transfer. 134 In the article, the quotations
attributed to Brdjanin contain such statements as "[w]e are going to defend our frontiers at
any cost" and that certain authorities "pay too much attention to human rights." The quotes
also indicate that Brdjanin, at that time a housing administrator, was drafting laws whose
purpose was "to expel non-Serbs from government housing."' 135 Randal's written
statement, provided to the Office of the Prosecutor, confirms the accuracy of the quotations
attributed to the accused and also
conveys the journalist's initial, albeit hesitant, willingness
136
to testify before the Tribunal.
Brdjanin objected to the attempt to admit the article and statement into evidence and
maintained that if they were to be admitted he would require Randal's presence for crossexamination. 137 Brdjanin would later allege that the interview with Randal was tainted, in
that Randal utilized the translation services of a fellow journalist ("X") who was hostile to

130.
131.

ICTY Ninth Annual Report, supra note 24, at 4.
Boas, The Principle of Flexibility, supra note 17, at 83.

132. Brdjanin Subpoena Decision, supra note 1, para. 1. Randal, a long-time journalist, was then retired,
sixty-nine years of age, and living in Paris. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Written Submission on Behalf of
Jonathan Randal to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence, Case No. IT-99-36-T, para. 5 (ICTY Trail
Chamber II May 8, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Randal Trial Submission].
133. Brdjanin Subpoena Decision, supranote 1, para. 4.
134.

Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, para. 4.

135.

Brdjanin Subpoena Decision, supra note 1, para. 28(A)(ii) (quoting Jonathan Randal, Preserving the

Fruits of Ethnic Cleansing; Bosnian Serbs, Expulsion Victims See Campaign as Beyond Reversal, WASH. POST,

Feb. 11, 1993, at A34).
136.
137.

Id. para. 28(A)(iii).
Id. para. 1.

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 39:257

138
Brdjanin and, therefore, failed to adequately represent Brdjanin's statements to Randal.
In light of Brdjanin's need to cross-examine Randal, the prosecution requested that a
for the journalist; the Trial Chamber issued the subpoena the
subpoena be issued
39
following day. 1

Further submissions regarding the admission of the article and statement, as well as
Randal's testimony, were made in February and March 2002. At issue, among other
concerns, was Brdjanin's position that X's testimony, rather than that of Randal, would
provide the best evidence. Finding the article relevant with regard to Brdjanin's mens rea,
and noting Randal's affirmation that he could support the quotations as accurate, along with
Randal's ability to testify regarding such additional matters as Brdjanin's demeanor during
the interview, the Trial Chamber found the evidence admissible. 40 Randal then filed a
motion to set aside the subpoena in May 2002.
B.

The Motion to Set Aside ConfidentialSubpoena to Give Evidence

Before the Trial Chamber, Randal maintained that the subpoena in question should not
have been issued, either as a matter of law or in light of the facts presented to the Court.' 4'
Specifically, Randal submitted that journalists should have a qualified privilege not to
testify about their newsgathering, 42 and that Randal's evidence cannot be probative in the
absence of testimony from the translator, X. 14 3 In support of his argument for privilege,
Randal observed that the Tribunal's power to compel testimony is not absolute, citing,
among other examples, the lawyer-client privilege per Rule 97 and the Simi5 ICRC
145
decision. 44 Noting the valuable service provided by media coverage in combat zones,
Randal proposed that the benefits provided by journalists reporting from these situations
would be curtailed if journalists were "routinely compelled" to give evidence,' 4 6 As a
result, Randal contended that either a qualified privilege for journalists or a rebuttable
presumption against the provision of their testimony, with very limited exceptions, should
be applied. 147 Although Randal's written submission to the Trial Chamber referenced no
authority for the implementation of a qualified privilege, the authority, according to
Randal's counsel, derives from the Trial Chamber's "inherent power to regulate its
own proceedings.'"
138. Id. para. 3.
139. Id.paras. 1-2.
140. Id.para. 5.
141. Randal Trial Submission, supra note 132, para. 3.
142. Id.paras. 13, 23. In support of this claim for privilege, Randal cited a case decided by the European
Court of Human Rights, along with domestic case law from the United States and the United Kingdom. Id.paras.
31, 34-39.
143. Id.para. 46.
144. Id. paras. 16, 18.
145. According to Randal, journalists reporting on these situations provide the world with important
information about international conflicts, alert the world to the commission of war crimes, and foster the
investigation of war crimes. Id.para. 12.
146. Randal Trial Submission, supra note 132, para. 12.
147. Under Randal's proposal, an unwilling journalist may only be compelled to testify when the Court has
been satisfied that his testimony is of crucial importance to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence,
the evidence cannot be obtained from another source, the provision of the testimony does not require the journalist
to breach an obligation of confidence, and the testimony will not put the journalist, his family or sources in danger
and will not jeopardize the effectiveness or safety of other journalists reporting from conflict zones in the future.
Id. para. 13.
148. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Official Trial Transcript, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at 5368 (ICTY Trial Chamber
May 10, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe36/020510MH.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
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While the prosecution agreed that whether a journalist should be compelled to testify
before the Tribunal was a matter that should be assessed by the Court in each case, it
proffered that such an assessment should involve a balancing of the competing public
interests at issue, 14 9 rather than involve the application of a rebuttable presumption against
journalist testimony.' 50 The prosecution maintained that the article goes directly to the
heart of the case against Brdjanin and that the Trial Chamber routinely allows the admission
of statements made through the services of an interpreter without requiring the interpreter to
testify. 15' Stressing the fact that Randal's article had already been published' 52 and that
Randal had retired from the field of journalism, the prosecution maintained that "Randal
offers no substantial interest that would override the powerful public interest that all
relevant evidence be available to [the] Tribunal, and Brdjanin's right to a fair trial.' 53
C.

The Trial Chamber Decision

In rendering its decision the Trial Chamber neither employs the test offered by
Randal, nor chooses to craft a test of its own. Fundamentally, this is due to the fact that the
Trial Chamber made the determination to be guided by minimalism in its assessment of the
matter. Almost immediately, the Trial Chamber so establishes the parameters of its inquiry,
noting that:
[I]n its role as a Trial Chamber it has a duty to limit itself to what is strictly
necessary for the purpose of deciding the issue of which it seised and not
to . . . attempt to decide issues that may well be very interesting and related to
the so-called journalistic privilege in the multi-facets in which it is presented, but
is really involved in,and truly relevant
go beyond, and have no bearing on what
54
Motion.'
the
of
matter
subject
the
to,
Thus, Judge Carmel Agius confines the inquiry to the matter appearing before the Trial
Chamber. As a result, the ensuing analysis does not engage in a theoretical discourse about
the right to, or potential benefits of, journalistic privilege in general; rather, the decision
limits its assessment strictly to the facts appearing before it.' 55 In addressing the issue of
Randal's subpoena, the Trial Chamber acknowledges that journalists should not be
subpoenaed unnecessarily, and that they should only be called before tribunals in a manner

Randal's counsel addressed the issue an additional time, stating that "this Court can put that protection into
Tribunal law.., by creating from its inherent power a presumption against compulsory process against
journalists." Id. at 5402.
149. This position is markedly similar to the assessment made by Judge Hunt in the Simi6 case. Ironically,
this is precisely the reference made by Randal in support of a qualified privilege. See Randal Trial Submission,
supra note 132, para. 24.
150. Brdjanin Subpoena Decision, supra note 1,para. 21. The prosecution maintained that Randal's interest
was not sufficiently substantial to prevail over the defendant's "right to cross-examine witnesses against him[,] and
the Tribunal's core fact-finding function." Id.para. 22.
151. Id. pars. 17.
152. Id. para. 18.
153. Id.para. 22 (citing Prosecution's Response to Written Submission on Behalf of Jonathan Randal to Set
Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence, paras. 30-32 (May 9, 2002)).
154. Id. para. 23.
155. Arguably, it is for this reason that the decision is critical of Randal's attempt to "[put] into one basket"
potentially non-analogous case law and fact patterns simply because the same relate in some manner to journalistic
privilege. Brdjanin Subpoena Decision, supra note 1,pars. 29.
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that will not frustrate the role of newsgathering.156 It is within this framework that the Trial
Chamber addresses Randal's status, focusing on the facts that Randal did not obtain his
information upon condition of confidentiality, subsequently published the information
obtained, cited the accused as his source in the published information, retired from the field
of journalism, and was, at the relevant point in time, residing far from the conflict area.
These relevant factors became a part of the "delicate balancing exercise" between some of
the aspects of the right to freedom of expression as they relate to journalists reporting from
combat areas and the overriding principle that the course of justice is not unduly impeded
by the withholding of evidence. 157 Thus, the Trial Chamber, noting particularly that "[n]o
journalist can expect or claim that once he or she has decided to publish no one has a right
to question their report or question them on it,' 158 found that Randal's claim of journalistic
privilege could not stand.' 59
It is worth noting, however, that the decision intentionally leaves open the issue of
journalistic privilege. Remarking that the issue of journalistic privilege was expected to
appear before the Tribunal, the Trial Chamber asserts that the matter was simply raised in
the wrong case. 60 The Trial Chamber observes that the fundamental question of source
protection, at the heart of almost the entirety of the case law relied upon by Randal, was
absent in the case, as was the issue of unpublished material. Distinguishing the matter
before it from the European Court of Human Rights case put forth by Randal, the Trial
Chamber strongly implies that if the case before it was on point with that decision, and
involved confidential information, the decision would be otherwise. 161 However, the
decision then stresses the need not to digress into an area that is not relevant to the matter
before it. 16
Put another way, the decision leaves the matter of journalistic
privilege undecided.
However, not unlike Judge Hunt's separate opinion in the Simi6 case, the Trial
Chamber decision also fails to refer to the authority employed by it in making its
determination. Although the decision clearly fulfills the Trial Chamber's responsibility to
ensure the realization of a fair trial and be consistent with general principles of fairness, the
oversight is remarkable for reasons outside of the decision itself. Not only would such a
reference have been beneficial for the reasons noted in the context of Hunt's separate
opinion, it also could have served to force the matter to the fore for discussion on appeal,
enhancing the accountability and credibility of the next decision.
D.

The InterlocutoryAppeal

Following the Trial Chamber decision, Jonathan Randal petitioned for, and was
granted, an appeal; the Appeals Chamber also allowed thirty-four media companies and
associations of journalists to file an amici curiae (amici) brief in support of Randal's
156.
157.
158.
challenge

Id. para. 27.
Id.
Id.
para. 26. This position is consistent with most U.S. jurisprudence. U.S. publishers do not routinely
the practice known as "authentication." See James C. Goodale, Washington Post Reporter Wins Big at

The Hague, 229 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2003).
159. Brdjanin Subpoena Decision, supra note 1, paras. 30-31.
160. Id. para. 28.
161. In an attempt to illustrate the narrowness of its ruling, the decision steps outside the confines of
minimalism by stating, "it would be a step in the wrong direction, a step backward, and a severe blow to the
freedom of expression of journalists ...if this Trial Chamber were to accept a standard lower than that upheld in
the [European Court of Human Rights] case." Id.para. 31.
162. The Trial Chamber subsequently limits its discussion because "this would not be strictly necessary for
the proper determination of the issue before it." Id.
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position. 63 Randal submitted that the Trial Chamber erred, both in not recognizing a
qualified privilege for journalists, and in not finding, based on the facts, that Randal should
not be compelled to testify. 64 With regard to the claim for a limited privilege, Randal
offered the same test submitted by him to the Trial Chamber.' 65 Randal proffered that in
the absence of such a privilege, journalists and their sources may be put at risk and
journalists "may be denied access to ... information and sources in the future,"' 66 thus
creating a "chilling effect."' 6 7 The amici, essentially in agreement with Randal, proposed a
slightly less stringent test for a qualified privilege, asserting that journalist testimony should
not be compelled absent a showing that it is essential68 to the determination of the case and
that it cannot be obtained from an alternative source.
The Appeals Chamber decided that oral argument should be heard in light of the
importance of the case and out of fairness to the parties and the amici curiae.' 69 At the
outset of the motion hearing, there was arguably a manifest difference in the approach of
the Appeals Chamber to the issue before it, as opposed to that of the Trial Chamber. The
Appeals Chamber made it clear that it was sitting to determine whether war correspondents
enjoy immunity against the obligation to testify before the Tribunal.170 It stated that, if such
a privilege exists, the Chamber's next inquiry would involve establishing the criteria for the
privilege's application.' 7' As a matter of course, then, the assessment of Randal's status
was dependent upon these first two issues and was consequently not the primary focus of
the Appeals Chamber's inquiry. 72 This dramatic shift away from the minimalism that
controlled the inquiry at the Trial Chamber likely served as a harbinger of things to come.
E.

The Decision on the InterlocutoryAppeal

The inconsistency in the approach to Randal's claim from the lower to the higher
court is only rivaled by the variation in the Appeals Chamber's focus from the motion
hearing to the delivery of its decision on the interlocutory appeal. In a radical departure
163. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, paras. 6-7.
164. Id. para. 10.
165. Id. para. 15; see supranote 147.
166. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supranote 2, para. 11.
167. These assertions are matters of dispute among journalists. See, e.g., Abigail Levene, Reporter Testifies
Against Milosevic, Stoking Debate, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2002, at A26 (noting that BBC reporter Jacky Rowland,
who testified before the ICTY, "rejected the suggestion that her testimony might put journalists at risk during
future conflicts"); see also All Things Considered: InternationalCourt Grants PartialSubpoena Exemption for
Journalists in Trialsof War Criminals (N.P.R. radio broadcast, Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter All Things Considered]
(representing that it is the opinion of Ed Vulliamy, a reporter with the Observer of London, that "forcing
journalists to testify isn't going to affect what combatants in far off places say to them").
168. Under the test, testimony is essential when it is "critical to determining the guilt or innocence of a
defendant." Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, para. 20 (quoting Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Brief
Amici Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities and in Support of Jonathan Randal's Appeal of Trial Chambers
"Decision on Motion to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence," Case No. 1T-99-36-T, para. 44 (Aug.
17, 2002) [hereinafter Amici Brief]). This proposal is nearly identical to standards embodied in the U.S.
Department of Justice Guidelines, which "require that the information sought in a reporter's subpoena be essential,
be unavailable from other sources, and be non-peripheral." Amici Brief, supra,para. 50.
169. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Interlocutory Appeal Transcript, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at 10,160 (Oct.
3, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal Transcript].
170. Included in this inquiry is the public interest served by the work of war correspondents and whether
compelled testimony of war correspondents would adversely affect their ability to carry out their work. Id. at
10,160.
171. Id. at 10,161.
172. "If there is any form of immunity for war correspondents, does it apply to the facts of this case?" Id.

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 39:257

from the manner in which the appeal was addressed at the motion hearing, the Appeals
Chamber frames its decision as one that "will address the factors that need to be considered
before the issuance of a subpoena to war correspondents."'' 73 This is certainly a marked
transmutation from what the President of the Tribunal defined as the "core issues" of the
appeal at the motion hearing. 174 Though the driving force behind this shift is a matter that
will later be addressed, it is sufficient at this point to recognize that, under either
methodology, the Appeals Chamber was setting the stage for maximalism.
Just as minimalism is not wholly good, maximalism is not without its virtues. When,
among other necessary factors, "judges have considerable confidence in the merits of [a]
solution," it is useful to endeavor to craft a solution that is broad and deep. 175 Indeed, this
form of judicial decision-making can have a positive effect on the resolution of issues that
have not been successfully addressed on a case-by-case basis. In such situations,
particularly when the Court consequently acquires a great deal of familiarity with a problem
and the issue 76 has not been addressed legislatively, maximalism can prove
quite beneficial.
Applying these attributes in the context of the Tribunal, however, is another matter.
In light of the fact that the judiciary is responsible for drafting its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, the benefit of the approach vis-A-vis legislative inactivity is lost. Further, the
likelihood that the Tribunal would have acquired the requisite familiarity in its own unique
context or one like it is marginal at best.1 77 One could also argue, at least with regard to
those situations anticipated by the judiciary, that confidence in a particular solution would
likely result in its inclusion in the Rules. In the absence of such confidence the dangers
associated with maximalism emerge: namely, the difficulties inherent in dealing with
problems in the abstract and the unanticipated consequences of the decisions rendered.
In its move away from the facts of the case before it, the Appeals Chamber decision
reveals the onus of dealing with theoretical abstractions. Attempting to assess whether the
compelled testimony of war correspondents would adversely affect their ability to carry out
their work, the higher court quite rightly acknowledges that "it is impossible to determine
with certainty whether and to what extent the compelling of war correspondents to
testifying [sic] before the International Tribunal would hamper their ability to work."'1 78
How the Appeals Chamber proceeds with the task at hand thus defies logic, in light of the
fact that it then "considers that the amount of protection that should be given to war
correspondents from testifying being [sic] the International Tribunal is directly proportional
to the harm that it may cause to the newsgathering function."'1 79 The decision, accepting the
arguments of Randal and the amici, states that "[w]hat really matters is the perception that

173. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, para. 33.
174. The President of the Tribunal stated, "it
would appear, that the core issues raised in this appeal are the
following. First of all, war correspondents, do they enjoy any kind of immunity which would protect them against
the obligation to testify in certain cases before this Tribunal?" Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal Transcript, supra
note 169, at 10,160.
175.

SUNSTEIN, supra note 125, at 57.

176. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 119, at 13-23 (noting, in a sub-section titled Miranda v. Arizona: When
and How to Do Maximalism, that the jurisprudential history of confessions and the consequent legislative
inactivity on the issue created the ideal environment for a maximalist approach).
177. Gideon Boas, Admissibility and Evidence Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY
Development of the "Flexibility Principle," in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 263, 265 (Richard

May et al. eds., 2001) (noting "the dearth of experience of evidentiary procedure in such a jurisdiction as
the ICTY").
178. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, para. 40 (emphasis added).
179. Id. para. 41.
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war correspondents can be forced to become witnesses against their interviewees[;]"'
inexplicably, the decision then proceeds to create a test that would allow precisely such an
event to occur. 181
In the final analysis the Appeals Chamber decides that, in order for a Trial Chamber to
compel the testimony of a war correspondent, it must find that the evidence sought is
"direct and important to the core issues of the case."'1 82 A two-pronged test is specifically
delineated: (1) "[t]he petitioning party must demonstrate that the evidence sought is of
direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case," and (2) "it must
demonstrate that the evidence sought cannot reasonably obtained elsewhere.' 83 Although
the Appeals Chamber maintains that it is for the Trial Chamber to apply this new test to the
case, it sets aside the subpoena and unquestionably signals that the facts do not support a
finding that the first prong of the test has been met. 184
1.

The Authority for the Decision

The rationale behind the mutation from the issue being one of privilege at the motion
hearing to a question of the considerations that need to be given before the issuance of a
subpoena is likely associated with the powers available to the Tribunal to render its decision
on the matter. It is clear that the Appeals Chamber intended to address the issue of
185
journalistic privilege, an approach consistent with the desires of Randal and the amici.
However, if the Appeals Chamber were to address the appeal as one which turns on the
presence of a privilege, absent a finding that war correspondents enjoy testimonial privilege
as a matter of customary international law, it is difficult to discern any appropriate authority
for such a broad determination. No such privilege exists in either the Statute of the

180. Id. para. 43.
181. The only way that war correspondents could not be perceived as potential witnesses against the people
they interview is to provide the journalists with an absolute privilege from testifying. Judge Mohamed
Shahabuddeen alludes to this fact at the motion hearing. Pointing out that a qualified privilege provides for the
possibility that even confidential information could be produced in court, he asks:
[d]o we have here a problem of the particular leading to the general, or shall I say the narrow leading
to the universal? ...[N]arrow as the case might be, does it produce a general influence, the effect of
which is to dissuade other interviewees from being interviewed at all by a journalist?
Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal Transcript, supra note 169, at 10,220.
182. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supranote 2, para. 48.
183. Id. para. 50.
184. Though acknowledging Randal's initial claim that he could support the accuracy of the statements, the
Appeals Chamber focuses on his inability to so authenticate due to the fact that he does not speak Serbo-Croatian.
Id. paras. 54, 56. The effect of the Appeals Chamber's commentary regarding the application of the test it crafted
cannot be denied. Indeed, in rejecting a subsequent motion on behalf of the prosecution to subpoena Randal, the
Trial Chamber notes that it is "difficult to depart from the reasoning of the majority of the Appeals Chamber
without having to anticipate an evaluation of evidence and facts which cannot be done at this particular stage of
proceedings." Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Decision on Prosecution's Second Request for a Subpoena of Jonathan
Randal, Case No. IT-99-36-T, para. 29 (ICTY Trial Chamber II June 30, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/decision-e/030630.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
185. In the period of time leading up to the appeal, it was reported that those involved in the amicus
campaign were troubled by the fact that the Trial Chamber "rejected a chance to formulate a qualified privilege for
Richard Byrne, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, BOSTON PHOENIX, Sept. 30, 2002, available at
journalists."
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news-features/top/features/documents/02452089.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2004).
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Tribunal or its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, although other privileges were considered
during the drafting of the Rules.1 86
Sub-rule 89(B) would not be the appropriate source of authority for the issuance of a
blanket privilege. The Sub-rule requires that the rules of evidence applied pursuant to it
"best favour a fair determination of the matter before it." Thus, the use of the Sub-rule is
inseparably bound to the facts of the case under the consideration of the Tribunal. The Subrule's language of limitation, wholly consistent with the concept of minimalism, would
certainly not justify the creation of a broad privilege. Additionally, the creation of a
qualified privilege through the use of the Tribunal's inherent powers would be difficult to
defend. Not only would such an attempt noticeably be dissimilar to the Tribunal's prior use
of its powers, it would also not fit seamlessly within the parameters of that which is
"necessary for the full discharge and safeguarding of the Tribunal's judicial function."'' 87
The Appeals Chamber's shift in its approach also makes sense in light of the fact that
the creation of a rule that bestows testimonial privilege upon an entire class of individuals
would rightly be seen as an exercise in legislating from the bench. Clearly, matters of
privilege should be put before the Tribunal as a whole. In this manner, with the benefit of
the written comments of ad litem judges 188 and input from the representatives of the Offices
of the Prosecutor, Registrar, and defense bar, 8 9 the issue would then be decided pursuant to
the opinions registered by the sixteen permanent judges.
However, in spite of the manner in which the issue is couched at the outset of the
decision, it is clear that the Appeals Chamber, at the very least, established the functional
equivalent of a qualified privilege. Indeed, most of the commentary regarding the Randal
appeal contends that the decision did in fact create a qualified privilege. 190 Various
members of the legal community, including one of the counsel who appeared on Randal's
behalf, espouse the position that the case-in-fact establishes "a qualified journalistic
'' 1
privilege for conflict zone reporters.
2.

The Ramifications of the Decision
a.

Equality ofArms and the Fair Trial Rights of the Accused

The test put forth by the Appeals Chamber thus places a burden upon the petitioning
party, requiring it to provide the Trial Chamber with a showing that the evidence sought
relates to a core issue in the case in a direct and important manner. The effect of such a test
calls into question the fair trial rights of the accused as articulated in Article 21 of the
186. 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 59, at 266-67.
187. Buteau & Oosthuizen, supranote 45, at 81.
188. See Practice Direction on Procedure for the Proposal, Consideration of and Publication of
Amendments to the Rules of Procedure andEvidence of the InternationalTribunal, U.N. Doe. No. IT-143-Rev.2,
para. 1(b) (ICTY Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/ITl43_rev2.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2004).
189. Id. para. 2.
190. See, e.g., Toby Sterling, Former Washington Post Reporter Will Not Have to Testify at U.N. War
Crimes Trial, Court Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 11, 2002 (noting that "[tlhe five judge appellate court said
war correspondents should be allowed a limited exemption from being compelled to testify"); Stephanie Van Den
Berg, UN Court Recognises War CorrespondentsRight to Silence, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 2002.
191. Barrister Details of Steven Powles, at http://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/data/special a/data!
viewBarristerDetails.cfm?iBarristerlD=71 (last visited Feb. 28, 2004); see also Bruce D. Brown, Foreign Aidfor
FreePress: Reporter Beat Back Subpoenafrom War Crimes Court, LEGAL TIMES (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 23,
2002, at 44 (stating that the "unanimous ruling establish[es] a qualified reporter's privilege for its proceedings").
In the opinion of the author, these restrictive assessments of the decision are inaccurate. See infra Part IV.E.2.b.
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Statute. 92 This arguably was an issue appreciated by counsel for the amici at the motion
hearing who proposed a test which differed from the one ultimately adopted by the Court
only in that it required that the evidence be "essential" rather than "direct and important."
According to the amici, there is a potential difference in the application of the test to the
defendant, in that "there is probably more that would fall there [within the realm of
is essential] more easily on the defendant's side than the
something which ' 93
Prosecution's side."'
Such a statement, however, reveals a lack of appreciation for the case law of the
Tribunal with regard to equality of arms. Although Judge Lal C. Vohrah did espouse early
on the position that "the equality of arms principle especially in criminal proceedings
should be inclined in favour of the Defence acquiring parity with the Prosecution,"' 94 this
position has since been rejected by both Trial Chamber II and the Appeals Chamber.
According to Trial Chamber II, such an approach "is tantamount to procedural inequality ' in
95
favour of the Defence and against the Prosecution, and will result in inequality of arms."'
Weighing in on the matter, the Appeals Chamber noted that the "application of the concept
the Prosecution acts on
of a fair trial in favour of both parties is understandable because
196
behalf of and in the interests of the [international] community."'
To complete the context that was set by the Appeals Chamber, it is important to note,
however, that the Court went on to add that "this principle of equality does not affect the
fundamental protections given by the general law or [s]tatute to the accused.' ' 1 97 Arguably,
these protections are difficult to reconcile with the test put forth by the Appeals Chamber in
the Randal matter. The test places a burden upon the petitioning party, defense or
prosecution, to justify its need for the evidence sought. Article 21(4)(e) bestows upon the
accused the right to examine witnesses, "a minimum guarantee under the Statute and under
international law."' 98 Rule 85(B) confers the right of cross-examination. "If the right[s are]
inverted so that the accused must justify why he or she wishes to [examine or] crossexamine a witness, then it might be argued ...that an accused's fundamental rights have
been violated .... 199

192.

Article 21(4)(e) provides:

In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: ...(e) to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.
ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(4)(e).
193. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal Transcript, supra note 169, at 10,215.
194. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Separate Opinion of Judge Vohrah on Prosecution Motion for Production of
Defence Witness Statements, Case No. IT-96-1 (ICTY Trial Chamber Nov. 27, 1996), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/61127ws2 I.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
195. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for an Order Requiring Advance Disclosure
of Witnesses by the Defence, Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 49 (ICTY Trial Chamber Feb. 4, 1998), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/90204WG25378.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
196. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, Case No. ITFeb.
16,
1999),
available at
(ICTY
Appeals
Chamber
95-95-14/1-AR73,
para.
25
http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/decision-e/90216EV36313.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
197. Id.
198. Boas, The Principleof Flexibility, supra note 17, at 69.
199. Id. at 57.
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Who Is Covered by the Test?

At the motion hearing the prosecution recognized the enormous difficulties associated
with creating and applying a legal test. In particular, the prosecution pointed out the
inherent difficulties in determining and establishing who would fall within the definition of
"war correspondent" for the purpose of a privilege, should one be established. 00 This
concern was all but dismissed by the counsel for the amici 20° who noted that the term might
include a person who gathers information for dissemination or may require that the person
be a paid employee of a newspaper or publication.20 2 Counsel for the amici further stated
he did not want to "minimise the task of making some of the decisions, but they are all
solvable problems and they are all dealt with routinely in any jurisdiction that has adopted a
qualified privilege. 20 3 Randal's counsel gave the issue equally little concern, citing the
Geneva Convention's reference to "ordinary etymological meaning." The counsel stated,
2 4
"[t]he use of the word.., covers the circle of people working for the press and so forth. 0
But the definition of the class of individuals who may qualify for a privilege is a
seminal matter. Armed with the aforementioned arguments, the Appeals Chamber rejects
the suggestion of Randal and the amici that the issue before it is "one concerning journalists
in general. 20 5 Highlighting that "[i]t is the particular character of the work done and the
risks faced by those who report from conflict zones that is at stake, 20 6 the Appeals
Chamber makes clear that its decision concerns only the compelled testimony of "war
correspondents. 20 7 This term is defined by the Chamber to mean "individuals who, for any
period of time, report (or investigate for the purposes of reporting) from a conflict zone on
issues relating to the conflict. 2 0 8 According to the Appeals Chamber, the term war
correspondents, thus, refers to a "smaller group" of individuals than does the category of
journalists.2 0 9 The validity of this assertion, however, is far from certain.
In fact, it took a very short period of time for actual events relating to a conflict to
challenge this opinion of the definition. A change in circumstance is something that, if not
foreseen, is nevertheless anticipated by a minimalist, and it can prove to be the bane of a
maximalist. The ink was barely dry on the Appeals Chamber decision before a whole new
class of war correspondents, falling clearly within the Appeals Chamber definition,
emerged. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, "webloggers" became an integral cog in the
wheel of saturation war coverage. "Web logs" find their historical base as "cyberspatial
diaries" but have developed over time as a medium for journalism. 21 0 The relationship of
"blogging" (on-line commentary) with the latest conflict in Iraq has been likened to that of
cable news vis-A-vis the first Gulf War.211 As a result the recent conflict has been
characterized as "the first true Internet war," with private individuals, including soldiers and
residents in the area of the conflict, "using the medium's lightning speed to cut through the
200.

Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal Transcript, supra note 169, at 10,233-34.

201. "It is not always easy, but it is possible and has been done, to define who is a journalist for purposes of
making a determination of who receives the benefit, as it were, of such a privilege." Id.at 10,238.
202. Id.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. at 10,246.

205. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, para. 29.
206. Id.
207. Id. para. 30.
208. Id. para. 29.
209. Id.Although this statement is obiter dicta, it is nevertheless germane to an assessment of the intent of
the Appeals Chamber in the crafting of its decision.
210. Tim Rutten, Online CommentatorsAre Seizing the Moment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,2003, at El.
211. Id.

A
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fog of war., 2 12 This new group of individuals was clearly not anticipated by the Appeals
Chamber, and its numbers are staggering. Arguably, it would take very little for an
individual who chose to avail of the benefits of the Appeals Chamber decision to become
established as a weblogger. The "Pandora's Box effect" of the Appeals Chamber
definition, however, does not stop here.
In the aftermath of the decision, concern has been expressed that it creates a "slippery
slope," in that it will invite claims from other entities, such as non-governmental
organizations, that they too should be partially relieved of their testimonial obligations.213
However, a careful reading of the Court's decision reveals that, contrary to what is likely
the popular view, many individuals working for these organizations will already qualify
within the parameters of the term "war correspondents." By not tying the definition of the
same to the terms "journalist," "media," or the "press," the decision arguably encompasses
persons employed by such entities as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watchorganizations that "equally send people into areas of danger to gather information which
they then publish. 2 14 Thus, regarding the testimony of people so employed by such
entities, it appears that there will be no need to request that the Tribunal recognize a
separate category of individuals deserving of special treatment. Allowing some room for
hyperbole, in light of the combined effect of the unwittingly broad definition employed by
the Appeals Chamber and the mushrooming status of webloggers, one might wonder
whether there will be any witnesses left who can be compelled to testify.2 15
c.

The RandalDecision and the InternationalCriminal Court

Much has been made of the precedential value of the Randal decision, 216 particularly
with regard to the newly-formed International Criminal Court (ICC). 2 I7

While some

observers have merely noted that the decision "will provide jurisprudence for the future
judges of the ICC,

' 218

others have ascribed to the point of view that it could likely affect the

212. Howard Kurtz, 'Webloggers, 'Signing on as War Correspondents,WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2003, at F4.
213. All Things Considered,supra note 167 (quoting journalist Ed Vulliamy as stating, "[t]he next thing is
that a big crowd of NGOs, non-governmental organizations, who do aid and humanitarian work, are also now
going to try and jump aboard this bandwagon pleading their special category status").
214. Ironically, this statement was submitted at the motion hearing by the prosecution in an attempt to
establish that journalists are no more worthy of a privilege than other entities, in similar situations, who are also
acting in the public interest. Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal Transcript, supra note 169, at 10,229.
215. Journalist Ed Vulliamy perhaps articulates the dangers of this point best, stating that "at a time when we
are trying to enforce international law and to bring these criminals to account, we are going to end up with the eyes
and ears of the world blind on the ground." All Things Considered,supra note 167.
216. Of the benefits attendant to an Appeals Chamber crafted standard regarding journalistic privilege, the
amici noted,
it will avoid unnecessary conflicts between journalists and this Tribunal or other War Crimes
Tribunals. And I deliberately speak, incidentally, of other tribunals as well because I think it fair to
say that whatever this Tribunal does is likely to have enormous precedential weight in other tribunals
around the world as they make their determinations as to what the rule of law should be on
this subject.
Brdjanin Interlocutory Appeal Transcript, supra note 169, at 10,192.
217. Created pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome Statute of the
International
Criminal
Court,
July
17,
1998,
U.N.
Doe.
A/CONF. 183/9,
available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
218. Van Den Berg, supra note 190 (stating the opinion of Robert Menard, director of Reporters
Without Borders).
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rules of the new court. 2 19 There has even been the suggestion that the United States' wellnoted antipathy for the ICC may have fueled the fire of the amici campaign in favor of
Randal.220 For his part Randal proposed that the decision of the Appeals Chamber should
offer at least persuasive guidance before other international criminal courts.2 2 '
However, one might question whether the decision should be so persuasive with
regard to the functioning of the ICC. It is true that, as noted by Randal, the Rules of the
ICC do not preclude the possibility of a qualified journalistic privilege.22 2 However, Rule
73, the ICC's rule regarding privileged communications, has as its prerequisite the existence
of confidentiality. 223 The ICC's requirement of confidentiality is far from insignificant; it is
the hinge upon which privilege turns and the result of much discussion and debate
throughout the negotiations of the Rome Statute.224 Within these parameters, further
negotiations were conducted with regard to the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence with the resultant Rule 73 being the product of numerous proposals and extensive
informal discussions.225 Consequently, it seems that, even setting aside the problematic
issues associated with the Randal decision, the matter is one best left for determination by
219. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Hague Tribunal HearsArguments on Exempting Reporters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2002, at AI0; Don Sellar, Why Make Life Worse for War Reporters?, TORONTO STAR, May 18, 2002, at H6
(questioning whether the Randal decision will "have implications for the way war correspondents will be treated
by the [ICC]").
220. See Dutan Babi, Randal Case: Ethical, Professional and Political Context, MEDIA ONLINE, at 4
(2003), available at http://www.mediaonline.ba/mediaonline/attach eng/7806.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
This accusation seems unlikely, particularly in light of the fact that the vast majority of American jurisprudence in
this area is the result of conflict between the press and the government. Further, this accusation was dismissed out
of hand by Carmel Agius, presiding judge at Trial Chambers in the Brdjanin case and representative of Malta at the
Rome Conference. When asked if he felt that Amici were motivated by U.S. anti-ICC sentiment, Judge Agius
responded, "Idon't think so. I think they just rallied in support of one of their colleagues... and in a matter which
they feel very strongly about." Interview with Judge Carmel Agius, Presiding Judge, Trial Chamber II,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Galway, Ir. (Mar. 30, 2003) (on file with author).
221. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Written Submission in Support of Motion to Appeal Trial Chamber's
"Decision on Motion on Behalf of Jonathan Randal to Set Aside Confidential Subpoena to give Evidence," Case
No. IT-99-36-T, para. 6 (ICTY App. Chamber July 2002) (on file with author).
222. Id para. 29.
223. Sub-rule 73(2) provides in relevant part:
Having regard to rule 63, sub-rule 5, communications made in the context of a class of professional or
other confidential relationships shall be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to
disclosure, under the same terms as in sub-rules I (a) and I (b) if a Chamber decides in respect of that
class that: (a) Communications occurring within that class of relationship are made in the course of a
confidential relationship producing a reasonable expectation of privacy and non-disclosure; (b)
Confidentiality is essential to the nature and type of relationship between the person and the confidant;
and (c) Recognition of the privilege would further the objectives of the Statute and the Rules.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 73(2), Doe. No. ICC-ASP/1/3 [hereinafter ICC RPE], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/basicdocuments/rules(e).pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
224. Helen Brady, The System of Evidence in the Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, in I ESSAYS ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 279, 296 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas
eds., 1999). Arguably, of particular relevance to the Randal issue, it has been noted that:
if something so nebulous as 'public policy' is to be accepted as a ground on which to relieve a witness
of the duty to testify, the Rules must clarify its scope so as not to unduly compromise the right of the
defence to cross-examine witnesses or unduly hamper the right of the Prosecutor to present its
case fairly."
Id at 299.
225. See Donald Piragoff, Evidence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 349, 360-65 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (discussing the debate as to privileged
communications among professional relationships other than attorney-client).
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the Assembly of States Parties as provided for in Rule 3.226 Not only does this seem to be
procedurally appropriate, it is also preferable in that it will expose the matter to discussion
and debate, and thus will more likely result in a workable outcome, taking into account all
relevant interests, including the rights of the accused.
V.

CONCLUSION

The judiciary of the Tribunal has been given a power that could very well make it the
envy of domestic judges. The Tribunal is not subject to a legislature that has the potential
to be unresponsive to its needs or unfamiliar with the best ways in which to deal with
difficulties experienced throughout the course of its proceedings. Benefits seldom come
without burdens, however. The broad leeway bestowed upon the Tribunal in its rulemaking
capabilities requires the utmost caution in its application. When addressing issues for
which there are no controlling provisions in either its Statute or its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, the Tribunal ought to clearly cite the controlling authority for its decision,
providing a cogent analysis regarding its utilization of the same.
Of decisive significance, when presented with issues that are complex and upon which
domestic solutions or the opinion of the judiciary differ, the integrity and effectiveness of
the Tribunal would be best served by limiting its decision to the facts of the case under
consideration. In so doing, theoretical abstractions would not cloud that which is truly at
issue; and, by the very nature of its exercise, the Tribunal would have, as its primary
objective, the assurance of a fair criminal proceeding.
By employing decisional
minimalism in precisely these situations, the Tribunal would not only limit the potential for
unforeseen and unfortunate consequences; it would also reserve the solution of complicated
matters for rulemaking at plenary meetings, assuring both the input of the entirety of the
judiciary as well that of the relevant actors in the Tribunal.
The case of Jonathan Randal illustrates the important role that decisional minimalism
can perform at the Tribunal. The Randal appeal decision circumvented the rulemaking
process, thereby denying the remaining members of the judiciary their right to weigh in on
the issue of journalistic/war correspondent privilege. It also foreclosed the benefits of
debate, discussion, and compromise inherent in the legislative function. Allowing itself to
be drawn far afield from that which was at issue, the Appeals Chamber wandered into
unknown territory, making an unnecessary decision. As a result, it imparted a test whose
definition arguably opens the door for an enormous class of individuals to claim access to
the quasi-privilege it established. The effect of the same on the Tribunal's truth-finding
function and the statutory requirement that it provide fair and expeditious proceedings will
only be known in time. In the aftermath of its rulemaking with a broad brush, however, the
Tribunal should likely be prepared to find itself painted into a comer.

226. ICC RPE, supra note 223, R. 3. It has been implied that the active involvement of the Assembly of
States Parties pursuant to Article 51 of the Rome Statute is, in fact, a reaction to the ICTY's failure to provide for a
mechanism to hold its judiciary's rule-making in check. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 166.
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